try; second, the capture of the enemy's capital,—and, lastly, the defeat of the opposing army. These objects, moreover, as we shall see, could not always be pursued at the same time; and we shall have occasion hereafter to note the effect upon the strategy of the rival commanders produced by the attempt to compass these not always compatible ends in the same campaign.

The Federal capital, as wo have above remarked, was situated on the very boundary line between the territories of the two "belligerents. The approaches to it were, moreover, Mocked by no natural obstacles whatever. Richmond, on the contrary, was defended on the north and east by the Chickahoniiuy, an tin-fordable river, the course of which lay between dangerous and extensive marshes. No army could approach the city from the wast without exposing its communications. The vulnerable Bide of lliclimond was the south; but to operate front that direction required the aid of a fleet such an, at the outbreak of the war, the Federal Government did not poNHesa

The geographical, features of thu theatre of war in the east were in truth exceedingly favorable for the Confederates. Not only^could the immediate neighborhood of "Washington be reached without difficulty, but it was also possible to reach the

fertile and .
populous regions of Maryland and Pennsylvania
lying to the northwest of the capital, without en-
countering any natural obstacle except the river
Potomac. And a movement in this direction could
be made entirely out of the range of the operations
of any Federal army in Virginia whone task it was